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North American Airline Mergers: Strategic
Response to Imperfectly Competitive
International Markets
JOSEPH A. CLOUGHERTY
The wave of domestic mergers among North American airlines during
the late 1980s and the subsequent reduction in competition increased Ihe
risk of higher domestic prices for airline tickets. Why then have the North
American governments allowed this consolidation to occur? Research to
date has focused on these mergers as a domestic phenomenon, but they
occurred in response to imperfectly competitive international aviation
markets as well. The North American nations and their international air-
lines could gamer the lion's share of Ihe supranonnal profits to be had in
these imperfectly competitive markets by cutting the costs of their inter-
national carriers. Matching international routes with domestic-route net-
works and establishing a global hub-and-spoke system lower the cost of
providing international flight service. Domestic airline mergers are a
means to creating significant domestic-route networks, cutting costs, and
allowing international carriers to increase profit shares in international
markets. Economic incentive for airline mergers is established and pro-
vides a basis for consideration of the political sphere; findings indicate
that these mergers are beneficial to private interests and are also in the
public welfare. Private interest and public-welfare political rationales are
often in opposition both in political literature and in practice, but in this
case they coincide. Empirical tests support domestic airline consolidation
in North America as a contributing factor in competitive gains in inter-
national markets for both the nations and the airlines.
There was a spate of domestic mergers and acquisitions within the
North American aviation markets in the late 1980s. In Canada six
carriers consolidated into Canadian Airlines International (CAI),
reducing the domestic market to an Air Canada-CAI duopoly. The
United States experienced something similar as the market share of
the eight largest U.S. airlines increased from 74 percent in 1985 to
89 percent in 1989. Mexico is unique in North America because it
had only two significant airlines in 1983, a situation that existed
through 1992.
To show a fundamental change in the North American airline
industry it would be desirable to illustrate a rise in domestic airline
market-concentration ratios over the last decade. An accepted mea-
sure of industry concentration and competition is the Herfindahl
index (HI), which represents the sum of the squares of each market
competitor's market shares. His were constructed from the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Traffic series. Two
measures of quantity were used—number of passengers and
number of departures, resulting in two His based on the different
quantity measures.
Without change in other variables, the North American His
would be expected to rise throughout the last decade, indicative of
the mergers that have taken place. Figure I (a) represents the Cana-
dian domestic His for 1983-1992. The two Canadian HI measures
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show a steady rise in the domestic market concentration from 1986
onward. The two U.S. HI measures in Figure l(b) also show a
steady rise in concentration from 1986 onward. The Mexican
domestic market does not parallel that of its northern neighbors, as
shown in Figure l(c). The Mexican domestic market appears to be
a remarkably stable duopoly with the exception of a large spike in
the passenger HI in 1988. This spike is indicative of deep cutbacks
in operations by AeroMexico, which were in part due to a stark
economic recession in the country. It appears that the mergers
in the United States and Canada did affect their level of domestic
airline concentration in these nations.
His are constructed on a national basis, a somewhat crude mea-
sure of competition and concentration. Morrison and Winston (/)
show that before deregulation there were many airlines but few
pair-city market competitors, yet in the late 1980s the number of
national airlines fell and the number of pair-city market competi-
tors increased. An average of all the domestic pair-city market His
would be more appropriate, but insufficient data are available to
arrive at one. The research focus is on North American consolida-
tion, but consolidation has also been evident in Europe. British
Airways, Air France, Lufthansa, and other European carriers have
bought out domestic competitors.
MERGER RATIONALES
Why have North American governments allowed consolidation to
occur, when their respective domestic aviation antitrust policies are
charged with prevention of monopolies and promotion of domestic
competition? Many writers nave looked at the rise of U.S. airline
mergers as an effect of domestic deregulation, which can imply that
mergers in other nations are a response to their domestic deregu-
lation. Some researchers contend that mergers are an efficient
response to deregulation. Morrison and Winston (I) stress the
increased competition in individual pair-city markets because of
large domestic networks. Levine (2) states that economies from
hub-and-spoke operations significantly reduce domestic airline
costs. Other writers view mergers as pernicious accruals of market
power. Borenstein (J) illustrates that the Northwest-Republic and
TWA-Ozark mergers resulted in quasi-monopolies in the markets
to and from Minneapolis and St. Louis—the respective main hubs
of Northwest and TWA. Kim and Singal (4) find that the efficiency
gains due to mergers in the United States are outweighed by the
market-power gains.
There are significant differences among the authors who focus on
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FIGURE 1 North American Herfindahl indexes, 1983-1992; the higher the HI the greater the
industry concentration—the highest possible HI is 10,000, for a monopoly, (a) Canadian indexes, (b)
U.S. indexes, and (c) Mexican indexes.
there is also agreement. Both groups contend that mergers are largely
a domestic phenomenon even as they differ on whether or not they
are an efficient reaction to deregulation. They pay little heed to the
international environment and how that may affect airline behavior.
International factors, not just domestic deregulation, were con-
sidered as explanation for the North American domestic airline
mergers. The aim was to assess the extent to which the mergers
were a reaction to international market realities. The hypothesis is
that domestic mergers allow a nation and its airlines to earn
greater snares of the traffic and profits in international markets.
Confirmation of the hypothesis would indicate that domestic
mergers are also a function of the international market environ-
ment and not solely due to domestic realities, as the literature now
implies.TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH RECORD 1517
THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENT
Economics
The nature of international aviation has changed over the last
decade as international markets have been gradually deregulated.
Despite liberal international competition conditions and airlines'
increasing freedom to set their own prices and capacities, interna-
tional aviation markets do not resemble the conditions that describe
perfect competition. International airlines increasingly have set
capacity independently, but entry into international markets is
restricted. Some recent Open Skies agreements show promise of
allowing free entry, but it is not in effect now, nor was it during
1983-1992, the period under consideration. It is more appropriate
to consider these markets as imperfectly competitive, as then-
nature falls between perfect competition and monopoly (5).
The Cournot model of imperfect competition, which empha-
sizes quantity adjustments by a few firms, is a good one to demon-
strate the long-term implications of international aviation
competition. Tirole (6, p. 224) states that "quantity competition
can more generally be seen as competition in choices of scale,
where a firm's choice of scale determines its cost function and thus
the conditions of price competition." How the size of an airline
operation affects its cost functions will be illustrated subsequently.
There has also been work that models the strategic competition of
a few firms as consisting of two subgames within one stage: quan-
tity competition comes first; a second period then emerges during
which there is price competition. Kreps and Scheinkman (7) show
that Coumot models of competition best approximate the long-
term results of this competition. This two-stage competition is in
some respects similar to the airlines' procedure of first scheduling
the number of international flights and afterward setting pricing
policy to fill seats. Coumot models are therefore reasonably good
models of international aviation competition.
Characteristic of the Cournot model of imperfect competition is
the existence of supranormal profits, profits above and beyond the
minimal profits found in perfectly competitive markets. Interna-
tional aviation is characterized by high profits on international
routes (8). Market profitability is sensitive to macroeconomic fluc-
tuations, however. Another crucial characteristic of Coumot mod-
els is that the lowest-cost competitor obtains the lion's share of the
market and its profits. The lowest-cost carrier in imperfectly com-
petitive international markets therefore, would gain the majority of
traffic and profits. Nations and their international airlines can gar-
ner a larger share of the international traffic and the corresponding
supranormal profits by cutting the costs of their international carri-
ers. This behavior is known as the strategic trade incentive in eco-
nomics and can make protection optimal for a nation, a situation
that does not occur under the normal economic prescription for free
trade (9). It is important to understand bow the costs of these inter-
national carriers can be reduced.
There are economies that result from matching domestic net-
works to international routes, because domestic networks make
international-route carriers more efficient in providing international
service (J). These economies derive from the existence of density
economies on a specific flight or within a specific market; with
every additional passenger, carriers lower their average costs (10),
The initial costs of providing air service are high and include the
acquisition of aircraft, maintenance facilities, gate and takeoff
rights, and even, to a degree, personnel. However, the additional or
marginal cost of providing for one more passenger is a few dollars
worth of fuel and a meal, and as a result the average costs go down
significantly—in other words, there are substantial density
economies. It is for this reason that load factors—the percentage of
available plane seats occupied by paying customers—are such
important indicators for the industry. One way of taking advantage
of these density economies is to match international flights with
domestic feeder-flights that funnel passengers onto a certain flight,
increasing the load factor for that flight and ensuring that it takes
advantage of density economies.
The matching of flights into a network brings up the issue of
scope economies. Economies of scope generally refer to two goods
being provided more efficiently by one company than two. In avia-
tion, economies of scope are found when the provision of one ser-
vice (flights from Los Angeles to New York City, for example)
reduces the cost of providing another service (flights from New
York City to London). Matching different pair-city markets into a
network brings about cost reductions, which is why the economies
from hub-and-spoke networks are often rightly referred to as scope
economies. It is important to realize that these scope economies
derive from the greater densities in an airline's flights allowed by
matching routes.
These economies of scope are credited with explaining many of
the hub-and-spoke networks in the deregulated U.S. environment,
but they are also apparent in international aviation. It is imperative
that international airlines take advantage of these scope economies
because the resulting cost reductions would allow international car-
riers to increase their international market shares and profits—the
strategic trade incentive. Mergers that provide greater scope
economies will be sought by international carriers to improve their
competitive international position and overall profitability.
Politics
Political considerations arise when an airline seeks to expand its
domestic reach to compete more effectively for international prof-
its. Airlines need government approval to complete mergers be-
cause of antitrust policies that protect consumers from industry
consolidation. It is possible to look at theories that explain political
action as being in either the private- or public-interest tradition.
Those whose writings promote the private-interest tradition see
explanations for specific public policies in society and the pressure
groups within society. In contrast, the public-interest, or state-
interest, tradition argues that national interest determines policy
formulation. Government officials act in the interests of the nation,
not in the interests of a few noisy pressure groups.
Private Interest
It is no surprise that airlines lobby governments for merger
approvals when international incentives exist. The acquisition of a
greater domestic network improves the competitive international
position of an airline, not to mention the potential domestic-market
efficiency or market-power gains. Industries' efforts to lobby gov-
ernment for actions that favor them have been researched since
Schattschneider's (11) work on the depression era Smoot-Hawley
tariffs. George Stigler (12) and others in the public-choice tradition
have done theoretical work modeling the process by which private
interests find it rational to lobby for public policies that favor their
ventures. The received wisdom is that these pressure groups or spe-Ctougheny 13
cial interests lobby a government for an action (i.e.. tariff protec-
tion, subsidies, or a merger) that is beneficial to them but not to the
public at large.
Public Interest
The case for public interest is stated by John Odell (13), who
observed that when market conditions change and make policy irra-
tional, governments change policy and yield to market forces. The
merger of domestic carriers could be considered an efficient
response to change in international markets because of several ben-
efits of such mergers. The mergers cause profit increases for home-
nation airlines at the expense of foreign airlines. In addition, the
home nation benefits from the added employment and economic
activity generated by its airline's role as a larger global provider
(14). Consumers also gain from merger efficiencies, because the
introduction of a lower-cost airline creates a more competitive inter-
national market with lower prices, more service, and a correspond-
ing international-consumer surplus gain. The state must weigh these
benefits against the potential costs of reduced domestic competition,
specifically the reduced domestic-consumer surplus and potential
employment reductions in the domestic industry. Nevertheless,
mergers can be deemed efficient responses to the conditions in inter-
national markets.
Coincidence of Private and Public Interests
The norm is for the societal and state theories of policy formulation
to duel both in the theoretical literature and in practice. Scholars
argue over whether it is interests within the state (societal or private
interest) or the state acting in the interests of the whole nation (state
or public interest) that defines public policy. It is not unusual for
arguments to arise over public policy when special interests desire
what is good for them but a counter-argument is made that the pol-
icy is bad for society.
The domestic airline consolidation policy is unique in that polit-
ical support can come from both societal interests (the airlines) and
state-interest keepers (government officials). Airlines seek these
mergers to improve their profits; government officials can approve
these mergers on the merits of their benefits to society, although
that is less usual. Governments act in response to the interests of the
airlines, but are not captured by these interests—consolidation also
improves societal welfare. Mansfield (15) has found that when
societal and state interests converge policy outcome is at its most
robust; he has called for more research on the interaction of societal
and state pressure in place of continued debate over the preemi-
nence of a single perspective. An instance of converging state and
societal interests over aviation mergers was examined.
EMPIRICAL TESTING
There are two major tasks for testing the analysis of the airline
merger phenomenon that is proposed. The first task is to test the
mergers' ability to improve airlines' shares of international market
traffic—the size of a single airline's domestic network should
translate into competitive international advantages. If they do result
in improvement there would be some evidence to support the idea
that airlines desire and lobby for domestic mergers. The second
major task is to test whether domestic mergers contribute to a
nation's share of international-market traffic. If governments are
to approve mergers for the public welfare, it is imperative that
nations obtain higher international traffic shares as a result of the
approvals.
The period of the analysis is 1983-1992. and the focus is the
international performance of the North American airlines and the
North American nations in the international airline markets. The
data set on which the tests were done is composed of international-
market performance and domestic-market performance statistics.
The domestic-market statistics are from the 1C AO Traffic series; the
international market statistics come from the ICAO Traffic by Flight
Stage series. The tests look at North American airline performance
in the international pair-city markets among the 3 North American
nations and in the pair-city markets among the 3 nations and 18
other major aviation nations. For example, the Mexico City-New
York, Mexico City-Vancouver, Mexico City-London markets and
all other international pair-city markets that begin in Mexico City
and go to any of the 20 other nations are included. All other cities in
North America that have international service to any of the 20 other
nations are also included. The data contains annual figures for
1983-1992, with both time-series and cross-sectional measures.
Airline Incentive Tests
The first test looks at the performance by North American airlines
in the international markets where they compete and tests whether
the scale and scope of domestic market presence contributes to
international market share. The estimated model is
INPSSHR, = P, + p,* DOMDEPS, + P,* DPMKTSHR,
+ P3*COMPS,, + p>LGINPSSHk
There is one dependent variable, and (here are two explanatory
variables:
• INPSSHR, the dependent variable, is the share of revenue pas-
sengers carried by a specific airline in an international pair-city
market for a particular year. The theoretical foundation laid out
leads to the expectation that international market traffic shares
proxy international market profitability. An increase in market
share translates into an increased share of market profitability.
• DOMDEPS is the number of domestic departures for the air-
line in that year. A positive relationship would be expected, as the
greater the number of domestic departures—the larger the size of
an airline's domestic network—the better the airline can take
advantage of economies of scope and therefore the greater its
ability to lower costs and increase share of the international market
traffic.
• DPMKTSHRistheairUne'sshareofthetotaldomesticdepar-
tures for that year, and a positive relationship between it and the
dependent variable would also be expected. The more an airline
monopolizes a domestic market, the greater its ability to take
advantage of the available scope economies and the greater should
be its share of international traffic.
The two explanatory variables are the crux of the argument.
Domestic departures proxies the size of the domestic scope
economies brought to bear on international market performance,
and the share of total domestic departures shows the extent of anTRANSPORTATION RESEARCH RECORD 1517
airline's presence in the domestic market and its effect on interna-
tional market competitiveness.
Two final variables are included to get a better causal inference
from the first two explanatory variables.
• COMPS is the number of competitors in the international pair-
city market; it would be expected that the more competitors, the
smaller an airline's share in that market. All markets for which an
airline possesses a monopoly (markets where COMPS = 1) were
omitted from the tests because domestic sources of cost advantages
would mean little to an airline holding a monopoly—its market
share would simply be 100 percent.
• LGINPSSH is the lagged dependent variable, the airline's
share of international traffic in that international pair-city market in
the previous year. Internationa] traffic rights are granted by nations,
so what airlines fly what markets and what their route rights are in
those markets is fixed with substantial rigidity. For example, the
share of Air Canada in the Montreal to Washington, D.C., market
in 1986 should provide a very powerful explanation of Air
Canada's performance in this market in 1987.
By inserting LGINPSSH, it is possible to look at the effects of
domestic departures and the share of domestic market departures
holding previous international market performance levels constant
(16). This mitigates the problematic fact that the larger the size of
an airline, as reflected by DOMDEPS and DPMKTSHR, trie
greater the route rights it could gamer from its government. Conse-
quently, the airline's share in the international pair-city market it
flies should be a positive function of its share in the previous year.
Results of Airline Incentives Tests
The results of the airline incentives tests do not deviate from what
was expected and they are shown in Table 1. The Ordinary Least
Squares method was first used to estimate the regression, but there
was significant serial correlation. The Maximum Likelihood Esti-
mate method was then used to estimate the model and correct for
serial correlation, and discussion of these results will be elaborated.
The regular IP is 0-46 and the total /P is 0.73; the latter is indicative
of the lagged error terms being included in the model. More impor-
tantly, the beta values all have the correct signs with significant
(-ratios. The beta value for DOMDEPS is 0.000013; an airline that
increased annual domestic departures by 100,000 would see an
increase of 1.3 percentage points on average to its international
pair-city market shares. The beta value for DPMKTSHR is 0.175;
an airline that increases its share of the domestic market by 10 per-
cent will see an increase of 1.75 percentage points on average to its
international pair-city market shares.
TABLE 1 Airline Inctnlive Tests—MLE Regression Results
Dependent Variable = INPSSHR
Reg Rsq = .46 Total Rsq = .73


























This test gives positive evidence that it behooves international
airlines to increase the size of their domestic networks because
there are international market rewards. These tests do not negate
other rationales that may be behind mergers, including domestic
efficiency or market-power gains. However, the tests corroborate
the hypothesis that airlines seek mergers and lobby for then-
approval partly because of the international gains mergers generate.
Nation Incentive Tests
The second test looks at North American nations' performance in
the international markets where they have national carriers and
compete, and it tests whether the scale and scope of domestic mar-
ket presence contributes to international market share. The esti-
mated model is
NTTNPSSHj, = P,«HMDMDEPS, + pz*HMDPMKSHt
! + Pj'NTCOMPS, + p^NTCOMPSH,
: + p^LGINPSSHj, + P^UNSTDTJM,,
+ P,.CANDDUM- + PT*MEXCDUM,,
There is one dependent variable, and there are two explanatory
variables:
• NTINPSSH, the dependent variable, is a nation's share of the
passenger traffic in the various international pair-city markets for a
particular year. For example, if American Airlines held 20 percent
and Delta Airlines 15 percent of the Miami-Santiago market, and
there were no other U.S. competitors, the U.S. share of traffic
(NTTNPSSH) would be 35 percent for that year. The larger a
nation's share of traffic, the larger its take of market profits is
expected to be.
• HMDMDEPS is the total number of annual domestic depar-
tures by home country airlines that fly the international pair-city
market. A positive relationship would be expected; the more
domestic departures behind a nation's international competitors the
better a nation can take advantage of economies of scope. These
economies of scope translate into lower costs for a nation's airlines
and a higher share of the international market traffic.
• HMDPMKSH is the share of total domestic departures held
by the airline's national competitors in a particular international
pair-city market. A positive relationship is also expected between
this variable and the dependent variable. The more a nation's inter-
national competitors monopolize a domestic market, the greater
the nation's airlines' ability to take advantage of what scope
economies there are in the domestic market; the national share of
international traffic should be greater as well, because of these
cost advantages.
The two explanatory variables, as in the airline incentive tests,
are the crux of the argument. The first variable shows the size of the
national domestic scope economies brought to bear on international
market performance, and the second shows the extent of a nation's
international competitors' presence in the domestic market and
how that affects international market performance. There are six
other variables:
• NTCOMPS is the number of home nation competitors in the
international pair-city market. There were contradictory expecta-
tions for the sign of this coefficient—increasing the number ofCloughei 15
national competitors could induce competition between national
carriers and lead to cost reductions and advantages over foreign
competitors, but could also split the domestic scope economies
available, thereby reducing a nation's share of international traffic.
• NTCOMPSH is the home nation share of competitors in the
international pair-city market. Clearly, if Mexico had two home
carriers competing in the Acapulco-San Diego market and the
United States only one, then Mexico would be expected to have a
greater share of the traffic, all other variables being equal.
• LGINPSSH is the lagged dependent variable, the interna-
tional traffic share by the subject nation in that international pair-
city market for the previous year. Again, it is expected that the
rights nations have acquired for their carriers would be rigidly
fixed; by inserting this variable it is possible to look at the effects
of other explanatory variables, holding previous international mar-
ket performance levels constant (16). That nations acquire route
rights in bilateral negotiations that are rarely revised is thereby
mitigated. Consequently, an airline's share in the international
pair-city market it flies should be a positive function of its share
for the previous year.
• UNSTDUM, CANDDUM, and MEXCDUM are dummy vari-
ables for the three nations studied, and are included to control for
any consistent bargaining or structural advantages held by these
nations in the markets they face internationally. The regressions are
run without intercept, to include all dummy variables.
Results of Nation Incentive Tests
The model estimates again meet all expectations, the f-ratios are all
significant, and the regular R
2 is 0.94 as shown in Table 2. The
regression results were again arrived at using the MLE method to
correct for OLS serial correlation problems. The first variable,
HMDMDEPS, has a beta value of 0.000000027, meaning that an
increase in home nation airline domestic departures of 100 million
would lead to a 2.7 percentage point increase on average to share of
the international markets served by the home nation. The second
variable, HMDPMKSH, has a beta value of 0.085, meaning that an
increase in home market share of 10 percent by an airline or airlines
in an international pair-city market should result in an increase in
international market share by 0.85 percentage points if all other
variables are constant.
The third variable, NTCOMPS, has a beta value of -3.8, which
seems to indicate that the more a nation adds home competitors to
a specific international pair-city market, the smaller that nation's
market share will be. The more home carriers in an international
TABLE 2 Nation Incentive Tests—MLE Regression Results
Dependent Variable = NTINPSSH
Reg Rsq = .94 Total Rsq = .975










































pair-city market, the more domestic economies are split and under-
used. This reflects badly on the U.S. policy of multiple carrier des-
ignation in international routes, at least in the area of its share as a
nation, if not in the area of competitive equilibrium in the interna-
tional market. However, these implications are counterbalanced by
the fourth variable, NTCOMPSH, which has a beta value of 0.5.
That value suggests that the larger a nation's share of the carriers in
a market the larger its share of traffic will be. Adding a second or
third carrier to an international market may reduce a nation's traf-
fie share as demonstrated by the value for NTCOMPS, but it is also
likely that it would increase a nation's share of the carriers in the
market, which increases a nation's market share, as demonstrated
by the value for NTCOMPSH. Adding a carrier would also
increase the values for HMDMDEPS and HMDPMKSH, both of
which positively effect the value for NTINPSSH. The advisability
of multiple-carrier-designatipn policy depends in part on the costs
and benefits as represented by these variables, which seems to indi-
cate that the benefits of multiple carrier designation outweigh the
costs.
The fifth variable, LGINPSSH, is significant and positive as
expected, as are the country dummy variables. The country dummy
variables seem to show that the United States, with a beta value of
5.9, has some structural or bargaining advantages compared with
its neighbor nations. Canada is not far behind in these advantages,
as the CANDDUM variable has a beta value of 5.5. Mexico suffers
from a dummy variable beta value of 3.6 and would be expected to
have a national share in its international pair-city markets of 2.3
percentage points below that of the United States and 1.9 percent-
age points below that of Canada, all other variables being equal.
These results make intuitive sense when the relative bargaining
power these nations have when dealing with other nations to secure
traffic rights is considered.
The evidence suggests that it behooves a nation to increase the
size and scope of the domestic operations of its international air-
lines in order to perform better in the international markets. One
w.ay of bringing more domestic economies to bear in the interna-
tional arena is to grant additional international route rights to other
home carriers. The tests show there are benefits to multiple carrier
designation as values for HMDMDEPS, HMDPMKSH, and
NTCOMPSH should rise as a result and lead to a higher home
nation share in the international markets. The benefits represented
by NTCOMPSH are dependent on foreign nations responding by
resisting the designation of additional carriers. There are also costs
in national traffic shares when additional carriers are designated as
demonstrated by the value for NTCOMPS.
Another way to increase the nation's competitiveness is to
allow mergers that increase the domestic presence of the home
nation international airlines. The variables HMDMDEPS and
HMDPMKSH reflect the size and extent of domestic networks,
and they positively affect national shares in international markets.
The test seems to corroborate the hypothesis that it can be in the
public welfare for governments to approve airline mergers,
because of the international gains these mergers generate.
CONCLUSION
The research integrates knowledge from the fields of economics and
political science into an analysis that explains the domestic airline
merger phenomenon. The analysis first considers the field of strate-
gic trade and finds that imperfectly competitive markets create aTRANSPORTATION RESEARCH RECORD 1517
rationale for government action when economics otherwise cautions
against most forms of protection. This field has been subject to much
criticism, in part because of its lack of empirical evidence (77). The
research helps in the defense of strategic trade by testing some impli-
cations of the strategic-trade rationale in the case of international avi-
ation, and h shows there are gains to be made in imperfectly
competitive international airline markets by consolidating airlines.
The analysis then considers the political science literature to
understand how and why pressure would be put on government
actors to facilitate airline mergers. The case of North American air-
line mergers is one of private and public interests sharing the same
policy position. The norm is to find societal and state interests
opposed. The empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that pub-
be and private interests coincide to yield political approval of North
American airline mergers.
The results also have clear implications for aviation public pol-
icy, especially foe the advisability of nations' sacrificing of domes-
tic antitrust policy aims for increased international competitiveness
(18). The statistical tests show that higher domestic-airline concen-
tration contributes to a greater share in international markets.
Domestic-airline regulators would be well served by considering
these international gains when appraising the merits of proposed
airline mergers.
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